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STEPHEN G. SELIGER
to be determined is how these programs can most
significantly reduce recidivism. Even though
rehabilitation today might not be a direct function
of reduced recidivism rates, this does not mean
that such programs should be discontinued.
Rather, more experimentation and research is
needed.
penologists understand the true nature of recidivism.
See also Shohan, Kaufman & Menaker, The Tel-Mond
Follow-Up Research Project, 5 HousToN L. Rxv. 36
1967). A. West in Cultural Background and Treatment
of the Persistent Offender, 28 FED. PROB. 17 (June 1964),
explains that the prisons must develop more sophisti-
cated approaches to therapy programs, since most of the
programs today are aimed at middle-class-not low-
class-psychosis and neurosis. More research must be
directed to determine the background and response of
the prisoners.
While a limited program of therapy is developed
in the prisons, efforts should be made to arouse
public support so more money can be made avail-
able from the state legislatures for more effective
and expensive programs.7' Private organizations-
The American Bar Association for one--should
conduct an extensive public relations campaign.
Groups should also lobby in attempts to persuade
the legislators themselves that improved conditions
in the prisons will in the long run benefit society
with a reduction in the recidivism rate. A positive
approach to rehabilitation-while certainly in-
effective by itself-is essential to the establishment
of a therapeutic regime in the American prisons.
7 Interview with Kurt Konietzko.
INADMISSIBLE CONFESSIONS AND THEIR FRUITS: A COMMENT
ON HARRISON V. UNITED STATES
STANLEY HIRTLE
Eddie Harrison and two co-defendants were
tried and convicted of felony murder, but the
conviction was set aside." In his opening remarks
at the second trial defense counsel announced that
Harrison would not testify,2 but after the prosecu-
tion introduced three confessions in which Harrison
admitted having shot the victim during a robbery
attempt,' Harrison took the stand. He admitted
an accidental shooting but denied that there had
been a robbery attempt.4 The resulting conviction
was overturned 5 because the confessions had been
obtained in violation of Mallory v. United States
6
I Harrison v. United States, 359 F.2d 214,216 (D.C.
Cir. 1965). At the first trial, defendants had been
represented by an impostor posing as an attorney.
2 Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219,225 (1968).
3Id. at 220.
'Id. at 221. Harrison claimed that the trio had
gone to the victim's house to pawn the gun, which had
discharged by accident. If believed, this would have
entitled him to acquittal on the felony murder charge.
359 F.2d 214, 220, n.17.5 Harrison v. United States, 359 F.2d 214, 222, 224
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
6 354 U.S. 449 (1957). The case rendered inadmissible
statements made during a detention where there was
an "unnecessary delay" in bringing defendant before a
magistrate, in violation of Rule 5(a) of the FEDERAL
Ru ss OF CanRMA. PROCEDURE, 18 U.S.C. See also
Killough v. United States, 336 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.
1964). The Court of Appeals found that Harrison had
confessed while being .detained several hours after
police had enough information to take him before the
commissioner. 359 F.2d 214, 222.
and Harling v. United Stales At the third trial the
testimony Harrison had given at the second trial
was introduced into evidence over counsel's
objection, but Harrison did not testify.8 He was
again convicted.9 In affirming, the Court of Ap-
peals held that since Harrison's decision to testify
in the earlier trial was a volitional exercise of an
individual human personality, the testimony was
sufficiently attenuated from the original illegality
and hence admissible at the subsequent trial. ° The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding
that testimony impelled by the admission of a
wrongfully obtained confession was inadmissible. n
7295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961) This case rendered
inadmissible at a criminal trial statements made by a
juvenile before juvenile court waived jurisdiction over
him. In the District of Columbia, juvenile court has
original jurisdiction in cases where a person under
twenty one is accused of having violated a law at the
time he was under eighteen. D.C. Con §11-1551
(1967), formerly Act of June 1, 1938, ch. 309 §6(b), 52
Stat. 596. Juvenile court may waive jurisdiction in
cases where the offense would be punishable by death
if committed by an adult. D.C. CODE §11-1553 (1967),
formerly Act of June 1, 1938, ch. 309 §13, 52 Stat. 599.
Harrison was under eighteen at the time of the shooting,
but was eighteen at the time of his arrest. The con-
fessions were made a week before juvenile court waived
jurisdiction over the case. 359 F.2d at 223.
8 392 U.S. 219, 221.
9 Harrison v. United States, 387 F.2d 203,206 (D.C.
Cir. 1967).
10 Id. at 210.
"392 U.S. 219, 224-26.
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There was a natural presumption, the Court
stated, that Harrison would not have made such a
damaging admission but for the admission of the
confessions into evidence. The prosecution had the
burden of proving this presumption false, and it did
not do so 2 Justices Harlan, Black, and White
dissented. 3
The basic issue in the case is whether testimony
given by defendant in an attempt to overcome the
effects of an illegally obtained confession should
have been excluded from a subsequent trial14 under
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine1 5 The
Supreme Court based its holding on Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, which held that
illegally obtained evidence could not be used in-
directly,1 6 and on California cases which applied
12 Id. at 225.
11 Id. at 226-28.
14 The Court first held that Harrison had no claim
based on the privilege against self-incrimination. 392
U.S. 219, 222. Courts have consistently held that
testimony given by a defendant at a prior trial is
admissible against him at a subsequent trial for the
same offense and is not barred by the Fifth Amend-
ment. Edmonds v. United States, 273 F.2d 108,112
(D.C. Cir. 1959); United States v. Grunewald, 164
F. Supp. 644, 646-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). They reason
that prior trial testimony is indistinquishable from
pretrial statements. United States v. Grunewald,
supra at 648. The rule seems questionable, however,
since the effect of reading defendant's entire testimony
from a previous trial into evidence is to deprive him of
his right not to testify at trial if he did not exercise
it at his first trial. See Curtis v. State, 212 So. 2d 689,692
(Ala. 1968). This is contrary to the usual view that a
new tripL proceeds as if there had been no former trial.
Orfield, New Trial in Federal Criminal Cases, 2 VII.
L. REv. 293,343 (1957); 39 Am. JuR. New Trial §217
(1942); 66 C.J.S. New Trial §230 (1950).
There was a distinct claim that Harrison was com-
pelled to testify against himself by the introduction
of the unlawfully obtained confession. The courts have
used language indicating that the privilege against
self-incrimination is violated when the state penalizes a
person for remaining silent. Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 6-8 (1964). But even though Harrison was in
fact compelled to testify-if he did not, the jury would
make its decision with an unrebutted confession before
it-the Court was unwilling to find a violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination. Since, as Justice
White notes, 392 U.S. at 229-30 (dissent), compulsion
will exist whether or not the evidence was lawfully
obtained, allowing a Fifth Amendment claim would
logically exclude all evidence harmful to defendant
since he would be compelled to answer it. However,
even though the Court does not recognize the harmful
effects of the confessions as creating compulsion in
the Fifth Amendment sense, it does recognize them
as a kind of compulsion which forms the causal link
between the police illegality and the testimony neces-
sary for exclusion under the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine.
15 The doctrine is also known as taint, and as the
derivative evidence rule. Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338,341 (1939).
16 251 U.S. 385,392 (1920).
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to exclude
testimony which was "impelled by the erroneous
admission of illegally obtained evidence".17 It
found these cases a logical application of the rule
it had set forth in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States,us Nardone v. United States19 and Wong Sifn
v. United States.2 The dissenting justices and the
Court of Appeals believed that exclusion would be
an unwarranted extension of the fruit of the poison-
ous tree doctrine. t It is useful to examine whether
the doctrine is being extended at all, i.e., whether
there are meaningful distinctions between the
situation in Harrison and those to which the doc-
trine has been applied in the past.
The courts exclude evidence obtained by unlaw-
ful police activity such as an unlawful search,n
detention,0 interrogationu or lineup identifica-
17 People v. Dixon, 46 Cal. 2d 456,458, 296 P.2d
557,559 (1956). The California cases held that when
it appeared that a defendant testified in order to
rebut illegally obtained evidence, the testimony could
not be segregated from the evidence. It did not
make the admission of the evidence harmless error,
People v. Spencer, 66 Cal. 2d 158,165-69, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 163, 169-71, 424 P.2d 715,721-23 (1967); People
v. Luker, 63 Cal. 2d 464,479, 47 Cal. Rptr. 209,218, 407
P.2d 9,18 (1965); People v. Polk, 63 Cal. 2d 443,448-49,
47 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4-5, 406 P.2d 641,644-45 (1965),
cert. den. 384 U.S. 1010 (1966), nor could it be used at
subsequent proceedings. People v. Polk, supra at
450-1, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 5, 406 P.2d at 645. People v.
Jackson, 60 Cal. Rptr. 248,251, 429 P.2d 600,603
(1967). See also People v. Stockman, 63 Cal. 2d 494,502,
47 Cal. Rptr. 365,369-70, 407 P.2d 277,281-82 (1965);
People v. Nye, 63 Cal. 2d 166,175-76, 45 Cal. Rptr.
328,334-35, 403 P.2d 736, 742-43 (1965); People v.
Davis, 62 Cal. 2d 791, 796, 44 Cal. Rptr. 454,457,
402 P.2d 142,145 (1965). California case law on the
exclusionary rule has influenced the Supreme Court
before. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,445, 282 P.2d
905,911 (1955) quoted in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643,651-2 (1961).
18 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Police illegally seized and
photographed certain ledgers, then used the photo-
graphs to obtain a search warrant for the ledgers. The
court excluded the ledgers.
19308 U.S. 338 (1939). The Court gave defendant
the right to inqulre into the uses which the prosecution
had made of an illegal wiretap.
20371 U.S. 471,485-87 (1963). For relevant facts
see text accompanying notes 29 and 30 infra.
21justice White, the principal dissenter, believes
that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
police misconduct; the possibility that a confession
would lead to incriminating testimony by defendant
is too remote to influence the police one way or another.
392 U.S. at 231-2 (dissent). The Court of Appeals
felt that the decision to testify was a volitional act
of an individual human personality and therefor the
testimony should have been admitted under the doc-
trine of attenuation. 387 F.2d at 210. These views are
discussed below.
22 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 1Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
24 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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tion." The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is
used to determine the admissibility of evidence in
some way connected with the illegality.26 The
courts have not dearly defined the doctrine, but a
few general principles do emerge. One, stated in
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, is that
evidence illegally obtained "shall not be used at
all"Y This requires the exclusion of evidence which
the state obtained by making use of some other
illegally obtained evidence. A similar provision,
stated in Wong Sun v. United States, requires
exclusion when the evidence "has been come at by
exploitation of the ... illegality".8 Cases decided
under these principles have been of two types. One
involves evidence which comes to light during the
illegal act itself. Thus, in Wong Sun v. United
States, an incriminating statement made by de-
fendant during an illegal search and arrest was
excluded as fruit of the search and arrest.29 The
second type occurs when police utilize information
discovered during the illegal act and, as a result of
investigation, discover new evidence. In Wong Sun,
defendant's incriminating statement revealed the
26 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967);
Gilbert v. California 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
26The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is one
test which is applied to evidence to determine admissi-
bility. Another is standing of the defendant to object
to the evidence. See Edwards, Standing to Suppress
Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 471
(1952). A third is whether the purpose of the evidence
will be to impeach testimony or to prove guilt. See
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62,64-65 (1954); but
see Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172, 175-80
(9th Cir. 1968). For a discussion of this area, see Com-
ment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A Plea far Relevant
Criteria, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1136 (1967).
"251 U.S. 385,392 (1920): "The essence of a pro-
vision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired
shall not be used before the Court but that it shall
not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that
the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible.
If knowledge of them is gained from an independent
source they may be proved like any others... "
371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). "We need not hold
that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply
because it would not have come to light but for the
illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt
question in such a case is 'whether, granting estab-
lishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to
which instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint'." MAQUIRE, EVIDEICE op GuILT 221 (1959).
29 371 U.S. 471,484-87 (1963). It does not appear
that any intermediate unlawfully obtained evidence
was used to procure the statement and hence it would
seem that the exploitation principle would have been
preferable to the use principle of Silrerthorne. However,
the Court quoted Silverthorne, 371 U.S. 471, 485, and
did not announce the exploitation doctrine until a
later part of the case, Id. at 488.
location of hidden narcotics, which police then
seized. These were also excluded as fruit of the
search and arrest. 0
Harrison does not fit clearly into either type,
although it resembles the cases in which police
follow up on information learned during the illegal
act. The major distinction is the lack of police
involvement with the testimony. The confession
was exploited, not by the police, but by the
prosecution which introduced the rebuttal testi-
mony at the third trial. Moreover, Harrison made
his decision to testify on his own, insulated from the
presence of police and prosecution by the protec-
tions of court and counsel. But the Supreme Court
was not bothered by this distinction. None of its
cases suggested that only police were prohibited
from exploiting illegally obtained evidence. And
even if neither police nor prosecution were in
Harrison's immediate presence when he made his
decision to testify, the prosecution had made the
decision necessary by confronting him with the
devastating effects of an illegally obtained con-
fession.21 Thus the state was as causally involved in
the procurement of the rebuttal testimony as it is
when police utilize unlawfully obtained evidence
and, by investigation, discover other evidence.
However, Silverthorne and Wong Sun also
indicate that evidence is admissible if it is derived
from an independent source," or if it is obtained
"by means sufficiently distinguishable [from the
illegality]". 3 This reasoning is used in cases where
police had access to both lawfully and unlawfully
0 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). This would logically
have fit under either the use or exploitation principles.
The Court did not cite the use principle here, but
instead announced the exploitation principle. This
consideration and that in note 29 supra make it appear
that the Wong Sun Court saw no distinction between
the two principles.
"1 Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85,91 (1963); Payne
v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560,568 (1958); People v. Spencer,
66 Cal. 2d 158, 163-69, 57 Cal. Rptr. 163,169-71, 424
P.2d 715,721-23 (1967); People v. Schader, 62 Cal.
2d 716,728-30, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193,201-2, 401 P.2d 665,
673-74 (1965). Confessions have special prejudicial
effects since both defendant and jury are likely to
regard them as conclusive evidence of guilt. The psy-
chological effects on a defendant are particularly
important since the exclusionary rule operates by
having criminals police the police by taking the initia-
tive and objecting to evidence. A criminal will not act
as a "private attorney general" if, because he had
confessed, he decides his conviction is assured. He
will probably choose to seek mercy and not antagonize
anyone by objecting to evidence. Thus it can be argues
that a higher degree of exclusion is needed to counteract
the effects of confessions.
251 U.S. 385,392 (1920).
371 U.S. 471,487-88 (1963).
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obtained information. For example, in Harlow v.
United States- police, by lawful use of an informer
and by unlawful search of defendant's mail,
learned that a certain individual was participating
in a bribery ring. This individual confessed during
interrogation and implicated the defendant. As a
result, a search warrant was issued and the mail,
which police had previously opened unlawfully,
was seized and introduced into evidence. The
conviction was affirmed on the grounds that the
knowledge was obtained through an independent
source. Such cases are difficult and must be re-
solved by speculating what would have happened
had there been no unlawful act and evaluating such
speculation in terms of who bears the burden of
proof.35
Evidence is also admissible under Nardone v.
United States where "as a matter of good sense"
the causal connection between the evidence and
the illegality "is so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint". 6 The attenuation doctrine is difficult to
apply, since it says very little on its face. The
language of Nardone suggests that it is designed to
prevent extreme results, as measured by the
intricacy of the argument claiming a causal con-
nectionY7 As a practical matter it may merely give
- 301 F.2d 361,372-3 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. den. 371
U.S. 814 (1962).35 The burden of proof, rather than the language of
the independent source principle may be the decisive
issue in these cases, since the facts of a case rarely
indicate what influence illegally obtained evidence
had on police decisions, even in cases where lawfully
obtained evidence was logically sufficient to excite
reasonable suspicion. In Harlow v. United States, 301
F.2d 361, 372-3 (5th Cir.), cert. den. 371 U.S. 814
(1962), defendant claimed that another's confession
had been induced by confronting him with knowledge
obtained from the unlawful search of defendant's
letters. The Court held that the participant might have
confessed anyway, and that defendant had the burden
of proving that he would not have. Cases like United
States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486,489 (2d Cir. 1962),
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,23-24 (1967), and
Harrison, 392 U.S. 219,224-26 (1968), indicate that
the State should bear the burden since its illegal act
has caused the difficulty. This problem is related to
the question of harmless error. See generally Maguire,
How to Unpoison the Fruit-The Fourth Amendment
and the Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. Cm. L.C. & P.S.
307,320-21 (1964).
36308 U.S. 338,341 (1939) "Sophisticated argument
may prove a causal connection between information
obtained through [illegality] and the Government's
proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such con-
nection may have become so attenuated as to dissipate
the taint." Nardone itself did not exclude or admit
any evidence, but granted defendant a hearing to
inquire into the use which the Government had made
of a wiretan.
37 Id.
a court a reason not to exclude evidence when it
doesn't want to.33
The Court of Appeals held Harrison's testimony
admissible, relying on decisions which held that the
causal connection is sufficiently attenuated when
police learn the identity of a prosecution witness as
a result of an illegal act.39 The rationale behind
these "tainted witness" cases depends on distinc-
tions between the testimony of a witness and
physical evidence. A witness might come forward
voluntarily if he were not discovered; physical
evidence could not.40 A witness has control over
his testimony, while physical evidence speaks for
itself.a' Thus in "an individual human personality
... elements of will, perception, memory and
volition interact" 42 in such a way that it may be
uncertain that the police illegality caused the
testimony of the "tainted witness"A'
13 Many of the cases where evidence has been ad-
mitted under the doctrine of attenuation were based
on Mallory violations. See Brown v. United States,
375 F.2d 310,319 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Smith v. United
States, 324 F.2d 879,881 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. den.
377 U.S. 954 (1964); Payne v. United States, 294
F.2d 723,726 (D.C. Cir.), cert. den. 368 U.S. 883 (1961).
It may be that the courts wish to avoid extending the
controversial Mallory rule. See Ruffin, Out on a Limb
of the Poisonous Tree: The Tainted Witness, 15 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 32,45 (1967). -
387 F.2d 203,209-10 & n.28 (1967) citing Brown
v. United States, 375 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
McLindon v. United States, 329 F.2d 238,240-41
(D.C. Cir. 1964); Smith v. United States, 224 F.2d
879,881 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. den. 377 U.S. 954 (1964);
Payne v. United States, 294 F. 2d 723, 726-27 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. den. 368 U.S. 883 (1961).
40 McLindon v. United States, 329 F.2d 238, 241
n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
41 Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879,881 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), cert. den. 377 U.S. 954 (1964).
4Id.
4This does not mean that the testimony should
be admitted in all such cases, just because causation
is uncertain. The issue is really the burden of proof.
See note 35 supra. Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471,486 (1963), held that the policies behind the
exclusionary rule do not distinguish physical and
verbal evidence. The case can be distinguished from
Harrison in that there the verbal evidence was a state-
ment made during an illegal search and arrest, not
strategic testimony given later in court. The tainted
witness cases have the additional problem of basing
the admissibility of testimony on whether or not the
witness felt like testifying at the time the police found
him. Compare Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879
(D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. den. 377 U.S. 954 (1964) (witness
who changed his mind as a result of conscience, ad-
missible) with Williams v. United States, 382 F.2d
48,51 (5th Cir. 1967) (witness presumably willing,
inadmissible) and Brown v. United States, 375 F.2d
310 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (witness presumably willing,
admissible). See also Smith v. United States, 344 F.2d
545,547 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (witness pressured by police,
inadmissible); United States v. Tane, 329 F.2d 848
1969]
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The "tainted witness" cases should not apply to
Harrison." There are significant differences be-
tween a prosecution witness whose identity was
discovered through police illegality and a defendant
who took the stand to rebut wrongfully obtained
evidence. Harrison was facing the death penalty45
and was protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination. It is dearly unreasonable to believe
that he would have come forth voluntarily and
admitted so much had the confessions not been
introduced. The causal connection between the
confessions and the testimony is very dear. Will,
perception, memory and volition are only relevant
as they provide meaningful alternatives in the
causal chain, not as mystical qualities which in
themselves invoke the doctrine of attenuation.
Thus the fact that Harrison made a tactical de-
cision to testify on the advice of counsel should not
be conclusive." Volition, reflection and advice of
counsel are irrelevant, since they could not have
helped to counteract the effects of the confessions. 0
The government should not escape by claiming
that Harrison made a voluntary act, when that
act was in fact necessitated by the introduction of
the confessions." Nor should it escape because the
decision was made as a matter of trial tactics. 9
(2d Cir. 1964) (witness pressured by police, inadmissi-
ble). This may make some sense in terms of causation
in fact but, evidentiary problems aside, the disposition
of the witness when the police arrive seems to be pure
chance, unrelated to any policy behind the exclusionary
rule. See Pitier, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree"
Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CAL. L. R v. 579,623-24
(1968). It may be that many distinctions in this area
are purely arbitrary. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and
Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378,390-91
(1964). See generally Ruffin, Out on a Limb of the Poi-
sonous Tree: The Tainted Witness, 15 U.C.L.A. L.
RFv. 32 (1967).
4Noted by the Supreme Court. 392 U.S. at 223 n.9.
4 387 F.2d at 210.
46 Id.
4T Id. at 215-16 (Bazelon, J. dissenting, pet. for reh.
en banc).
4For a discussion of the self-incrimination aspects
of the case see note 14 supra.
49 The harmful effects that police illegality can have
on defendant's trial tactics have not been ignored. The
facts of Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85,91 (1963), are
not unlike those in Harrison in that there evidence
illegally seized and confessions induced by the seizure
were introduced, and defendants took the stand in the
hope of mitigating them. The Court recognized the
limitations this placed on their case as an example of
the prejudice caused by the admission of the evidence,
but did not rule on the testimony itself. See also United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,240-41 (1967). There
the Court recognized the harm done to defendant's
case if counsel had to dwell on lineup identifications by
prosecution witnesses in the hope of finding some il-
legality.
Thus the Court of Appeals decision appears erro-
neously based.5 0
The proper result of the case and the proper
scope of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
should be determined by considering the policies
behind the exclusionary rule'L--deterrence of
police misconduct and preservation of the moral
force of the law.5 2 To deter police misconduct
effectively, the courts must consider the psychology
of the policeman. Presumably the police will be less
5 The Court of Appeals also held "[ilt would be
rash to assume that defendants.., would be induced
to testify favorably to the Government by either the
introduction of the prior confessions or their procure-
ment three years previously." 387 F.2d at 210. The
Court ignored the fact that testimony is favorable or
unfavorable relative to the evidence already before
the court. Thus Harrison's testimony admitting the
shooting but denying the robbery attempt was favorable
to him in the presence of the confession admitting
both the shooting and the robbery attempt. It was
unfavorable to him at the third trial where there was
little other evidence connecting him with the shooting.
387 F.2d at 210-12.
" Theoretically the doctrine should cease to be
applied at the point of diminishing returns where the
social cost in terms of police illegality which could
have been deterred and public respect for the law
which could have been preserved is outweighed by
the social cost of releasing criminals instead of jailing
them. See Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A
Plea for Relevant Criteria. 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1136,
1140 (1967). This paper will not attempt to measure
such social cost. Instead it will assume that any sub
stantial deterrence of police illegality or furtherance
of the integrity of the law will outweigh whatever
harm may be done by releasing Harrison and any
others similarly situated. This assumption seems
reasonable in view of the willingness of courts to exclude
evidence in the past and the limited scope of Harrison
in comparison with other decisions such as Miranda.
Justice White agrees with this approach in his dissent,
although not with the result. He says that the only
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter the police
and that exclusion in Harrison does not substantially
deter the police because they will not foresee the use of
the confession. 392 U.S. at 231-2. Of course one deter-
mines how much deterrence is substantial by evaluating
the social costs mentioned above. This is probably a
matter of individual point of view and more empirical
evidence is needed. See Comment, Interrogations in
New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L. J.
1519 (1967); Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding
Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 283 (1965).
Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219,224 n.10
(1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479-80
(1966); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,222-23
(1960); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,485
(1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). The Mallory rule is
based on these considerations. Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449,452-53 (1957). Harling v. United
States, 295 F.2d 161,163-64 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1961),
is based on these considerations and another, the
parens patriae function of the juvenile court. Harling
is probably obselete in view of In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1,55 (1967), which held that the privilege against
self-incrimination applies to juvenile court proceedings.
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likely to act illegally if the evidence obtained can
not be used in court. But it is not conclusive to
note, as Justice White does, that the police who
detained Harrison could not have forseen that
incriminating testimony would result.0 Exceptions
to the exclusionary rule may defeat the rule by
encouraging the police to act illegally in the hopi
that a conviction will result, even if some evidence
may be excluded.- The policeman, in deciding
whether to act legally or illegally, may be moti-
vated by emotional zeal as well as by the desire to
obtain a conviction. He may also evaluate the
alternative benefits of harassment as a means
of controlling criminals,"1 as well as the likelihood
of getting a conviction if the rules are observed. In
the latter sense, it is possible that too many
exclusionary rules will deter the police from trying
to get convictions at all and encourage them to
adopt harassment as an alternative policy. Thus,
as the courts have admitted, any attempt to predict
the effect that exclusion in a particular set of
circumstances will have on police conduct may be
speculation. 56
The policy of preserving the moral force of the
law is dearer. The state's law enforcement machin-
ery should act as adversary to the criminal in such
a way as will earn the respect of the public. 7 As
such it should- not benefit from its own wrong-
doing,"3 especially consciously or deliberately. In
the language of Wong Sun v. United States, it
should not exploit illegality. 59 If it attempts to do
so the judge must preserve the moral force of the
law by negating any benefit which it may have
received. 60 Even though it may be impossible to put
defendant and prosecution in the position they
would have been had the police acted lawfully,"
E8 392 U.S. at 231-32 (dissent).
"People v. Bilderbach, 62 Cal. 2d 757,766-67, 44
Cal. Rptr. 313, 318-19, 401 P.2d 921, 926-7, (1965).
15See Comment, Search and Seizure in Illinois:
Enforcement of the Constitutional Right of Privacy,
47 Nw. U.L. REv. 493,498, 502 (1952).
5"Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219,224
n.10 (1968); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,218
(1960). For empirical attempts to deal with the problem,
see note 51 supra.
""The quality of a nation's civilization can be
largely measured by the methods it uses in the en-
forcement of its criminal law." Schaefer, Federalism
and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HAav. L. Rav. 1,26
(1956) quoted in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,480
(1966).
"People v. Bilderbach, 62 Cal. 2d 757,763, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 313,316, 401 P.2d 921,924 (1965).
69 371 U.S. 471,487-88 (1963).
&0This is "the imperative of judicial integrity."
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,222 (1960).
61 United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947).
official disapproval of police lawlessness is of great
importance." In Harrison the police obtained the
confessions unlawfully; the prosecutor introduced
them at the second trial and, deprived of them at
the third trial by the exclusionary rule, built his
case around the testimony which Harrison had
given in what appears to have been a desperate
attempt to rebut the confessions. In this sense the
testimony caused by the confessions was being
used as a substitute for them. Because this practice
is such an exploitation of illegality as to be incon-
sistent with judicial integrity, the Supreme Court's
decision appears to be correct.
The effects of the case are expressly limited by
the Court to the peculiar facts which the case
presents," but they will no doubt extend into
cases with similar facts. The Court did not base its
holding on the kind of police illegality," implying
thereby that exclusion based on Mallory will go as
far as exclusion based on any other rule. It did give
weight to the special prejudicial effects of con-
fessions. 6 However, it is likely that any unlaw-
fully obtained evidence which is so damaging as to
cause a conviction if not rebutted will be subject to
the same considerations. A more difficult question
is presented if there were both lawfully and un-
lawfully obtained incriminating evidence present
when defendant testified, since the prosecution
would claim that the evidence came from an inde-
pendent source. In view of the recognized prej-
udicial effects of confessions, the courts are likely
to exclude any testimony which is a rebuttal of an
unlawfully obtained confession, even though there
is other evidence on the same point. A harder
question is whether all of defendant's testimony
might be excluded in such a case. The California
cases suggest that it might not be." The key ques-
tion may be to what extent the prosecution must
show that the testimony was not induced by the
1Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,485
(1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). Official disapproval
of police lawlessness is more important than official
disapproval of individual lawlessness, since the police,
as servants of the state, claim power and authority
superior to that of the individual.
"392 U.S. at 223 n.9.
4Similarly People v. Schader 62 Cal. 2d 716 728-
31, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193, 200-02, 401 P.2d 665, 672-74,
(1965). But see Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,
308 (1966).
65 392 U.S. at 222-3. See note 36 supra.
1 People v. Mathis, 63 Cal. 2d 416,432-34, 406
P.2d 65,76,46 Cal. Rptr. 785,796 (1965), cert. den.
385 U.S. 857 (1966); People v. Nye, 63 Cal. 2d 166,
175-6, 403 P.2d 736,742-3, 45 Cal. Rptr. 328,334-5
(1965). These cases held that testimony was not im-
pelled in that situation.
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confession. If the unlawfully obtained evidence
were not a confession, the court might not find that
it was necessary for defendant to rebut it.
It is probable that Harrison, like the impelled
testimony rule in California, will apply only to
testimony given subsequent to the admission of the
unlawfully obtained evidence, 1 not to the use of
tainted evidence for impeachment purposes s or to
any situation where the evidence was not intro-
duced, but only anticipated. 69 It does not appear to
overrule the doctrine of attenuation, nor is it
inconsistent with the tainted witness casesY° In-
deed the California courts, whose impelled testi-
mony rule is precedent for Harrison, have allowed
a tainted witness to testify7' and have expressly
stated that an act of free will can render evidence
admissible under the doctrine of attenuation
2
Harrison also deals with the practical problem of
who bears the burden of proving that certain
evidence is tainted. Nardone held on this point
that once the illegality was established, the de-
fendant must be allowed "to prove that a sub-
stantial portion of the case against him was fruit
17 Gafford v. State, 440 P.2d 405,412 (Alaska 1968).
68 This exception to the general exclusionary rule is
permitted under Walder v. United States, 347 U.S.
62,64-5 (1954), although it has recently been limited
and criticized by the Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172, 175-80
(9th Cir. 1968).69 Justice White is bothered by problems of this
kind. 392 U.S. at 234 (dissent). He fears that a con-
fession obtained during a Mallory violation would
taint a guilty plea or later testimony by defendant,
regardless of whether it was introduced. This need
not follow. The psychological defeatism caused by
the confession will be overcome if counsel enters the
case at a sufficiently early time and informs defendant
that the confession is inadmissible. In this situation
no harm will have been done by the confession. The
situation in Harrison is different since the confession
was before the court.
70The distinctions between the tainted witness
situation and Harrison were discussed above. See
text accompanying note 44 supra.
7
1 People v. Stoner, 65 Cal. 2d 595, 602, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 897,901, 422 P.2d 585,589, (1967).
7 People v. Sesslin, 67 Cal. Rptr. 409,416-17, 439
P.2d 321,328-9, (1968).
of the poisonous tree. This leaves ample oppor-
tunity for the government to convince the court
that its proof had independent origin." 71 Maguire
interprets this to mean that defendant need only
show a reasonable possibility that the evidence
was derived from the illegality, at which time the
prosecution must prove that it was not.74 Harrison
seems to take this a step further and require the
prosecution to prove there was no taint any time
the court can infer that there was? 5 If this is true,
then as a practical matter the burden of proof is on
the prosecution in any dose case. On the other
hand, it can be argued that in Harrison, the
burden of raising a reasonable possibility of taint
was on the defendant and he met this burden by
inference. If this is true then the old rules still
apply. In any case, the spirit of Harrison is clearly
to put a special burden on the wrongdoer to prove
that his wrong was harmless The result should be
more acquittals in cases where evidence appears
tainted, even though the language of attenuation
and independent source remain the same.
7"Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338,341
(1939).74 Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit-The Fourth
Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. Cpm.
L.C. & P.S. 307,309-10 (1964). Note that Maguire
finds an exception in cases involving the motives of
defendant, of which defendant would have special
knowledge. Id. at 321. Harrison is clearly a contrary
holding. 392 U.S. at 224-6. Indeed it is difficult to
imagine how a prosecutor could prove that a defendant
was in fact not motivated by the confessions.
75 392 U.S. 219,224-25 (1968). "But, having illegally
placed his confessions before the jury, the Govern-
ment can hardly demand a demonstration by the
petitioner that he would not have testified as he
did if his inadmissible confessions had not been
used. 'The springs of conduct are subtle and varied,'
Mr. justice Cardozo once observed. 'One who med-
dies with them must not insist upon too nice a
measure of proof that the spring which he released
was effective to the exclusion of all others.' Having
'released the spring' by using the petitioner's un-
lawfully obtained confessions against him, the
Government must show that its illegal action did
not induce his testimony."
76 392 U.S. at 224-25. See note 75 supra. See also
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,23-24 (1967).
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